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NRA 2017 
Very Low Very High 
Extremely Unlikely 
Very Likely 
National Risk Matrix 2017  
IMPACT 
L
IK
E
L
IH
O
O
D
 
A. Storm *** E. Tsunami *** I. Food Contamination *** M. Maritime Accident *** Q. Fire *** 
B. Flooding *** F. Infectious Disease *** J. Loss of Critical Infrastructure *** N. Transport Hub *** R. Nuclear Incident (Abroad) *** 
C. Snow *** G. Terrorist Incident *** K. Rail Accident *** P. Hazmat ** S. Disruption to Energy Supply *** 
D. Low Temp. *** H. Animal Disease *** l. Aviation Accident *** O. Industrial Incident ** T: Network & Information 
    Security/Cyber Incident ** 
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Risk Assessment Confidence Levels: *** High Confidence  ** Moderate Confidence * Low Confidence 
Likelihood – Food Contamination 
Rating Classification Average Recurrence Interval 
3 Unlikely 10 - 100 years between occurrences  
Food Contamination 5 Very High Impact 
People Deaths greater than 1 in 20,000 
people for population of 
interest 
OR 
Critical injuries/illness greater 
than 1 in 20,000 
Environment Very heavy contamination, 
widespread effects of extended 
duration 
Economic Greater than 8% of Annual 
Budget 
Social 
Consideration 
should be given to: 
Infrastructure; 
Community Services; 
Utilities; 
Evacuation/ 
Quarantine; 
Property/Housing; 
Supplies: Food, Water, Medicines; 
Civil Unrest; 
Public dissatisfaction 
Community unable to function 
without significant support 
Confidence Level - Food Contamination 
Confidence Level Criteria 
High *** 
Assessment based on expert knowledge of the issue and/or reliable, 
relevant, current data.   
Consistent agreement among assessors. 
Public Perception 
(2018) 
 
 
  
Data Collection 
• Survey completed online using “Qualtrics” 
 
• 6,497 responses* received  
 
• Data collected over a two month period between 14th November 2017 
& 17th January 2018 
 
 
 
*Note – some respondents did not answer all questions 
 
Demographics 
Characteristic   
Adults (age >18) living at the address (4446n) 
Mode 2 
Range (min, max) 1 - 9 
Children (age <18) living at the address (4408n) 
Mode 0 
Mean 0.85 
Range (min, max) 0 - 7 
Highest Qualification (4435n) 
Leaving Cert.  17.5% (777n) 
Bachelor’s degree or higher diploma 32.5% (1443n) 
 Master degree or post-graduate diploma 27.9% (1239n) 
Work (4427n)   
Full-time 73.9% (3272n) 
Characteristic   
Gender (4490n)   
Female 70.6% (3171n) 
Age (4383n)   
Mean (SD) 45.06 (11.89) 
Min, Max 18, 92 
Lives in (4487n)   
City 16.8% (755n) 
Suburbs or outskirts of a city 21.9% (982n) 
Town 21.8% (979n) 
Village 9.6% (431n) 
Rural area 29.9% (1304n) 
Own vs Rent Home (4477n)   
Own Home  77.7% (3479n) 
Household Income 
Income Below 30,000 12.2% (532n) 
Income 30,000-70,000 53.5% (2328n) 
Income Over 70,000 34.3% (1491n) 
Food Contamination  Code  Percent 
Extremely Unlikely 1 19.5% 
Very Unlikely 2 20.7% 
Unlikely 3 41.6% 
Likely 4 14.6% 
Very Likely 5 3.6% 
Food Contamination Code  Percent 
Very Low Impact 1 13.0% 
Low Impact 2 18.4% 
Moderate Impact 3 29.7% 
High Impact 4 26.3% 
Very High Impact 5 12.6% 
Food Contamination: Likelihood & Impact 
n = 6007 n = 5466 
Food Contamination: Risk Rating 
  Likelihood Impact Risk Rating 
N 6007 5466 5466 
Mean 2.62 3.07 8.04 
Mode 3 3 9 
Very Low Very High 
Extremely Unlikely 
Very Likely 
Public V Expert Risk Rating: Food Contamination 
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Public  Expert - NRA 
Public Perception: 
Experience, Worry & 
Preparedness 
 
  
85% 
7% 
8% 
No
Indirectly, someone close to me has
experienced this emergency
Yes
n=5357 
Experience of Food Contamination 
62% 
24% 
11% 
2% 
1% 
Not at all
A little
A moderate amount
A lot
A great deal
n=5240 
Food Contamination: Worry 
Food Contamination: Preparedness 
 26.4% 
 27.9% 
 32.5% 
 13.2% 
Nothing I do to prepare will help should this emergency
occur
I do not need to prepare for this emergency
I am not prepared to deal with this emergency, but I do
see a benefit in preparing
I am prepared for this emergency
n=4697 
Finally: Relative Risk 
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Health Protection Surveillance Centre 
To improve the health of the Irish population by provision of the best 
possible information on disease including infectious diseases through 
surveillance and independent advice, epidemiological investigation, 
research and training. 
Health Protection Surveillance Centre 
Six Functions 
o Surveillance of communicable diseases 
o Operational support 
o Training 
o Research 
o Policy advice 
o Public Information www.hpsc.ie 
 
 
What is an outbreak? 
• Occurrence of more cases of disease than expected  
 
– over a particular period of time (TIME) 
– in a given area (PLACE) 
– among a specific group of people (PERSON) 
 
Why do we investigate an outbreak? 
• Responsible for much illness and death 
• Identify the source and eliminate it  
• Minimise human harm 
• Prevent future outbreaks 
• Evaluate existing prevention strategies 
• Describe new diseases and learn more about known diseases 
• Improve surveillance and outbreak detection 
 
Are Foodborne Disease Outbreaks Common? 
• In developed countries, 90% of all outbreaks are   gastrointestinal  
• Majority are viral 
• Only a small minority are shown to be foodborne in nature 
 
 
Country Year Outbreaks Cases
Ireland (IID) 2015 315 3086
Ireland 
(Foodborne)
2015 6 24
US (Foodborne) 2015 902 15,202 
Outbreak Agents 
• Bacterial 
– Salmonella, E. coli, Campylobacter, Listeria etc.  
• Viral 
– Norovirus, Hepatitis A 
• Parasitic 
– Cryptosporidium, Trichinella, Giardia, etc. 
• Toxins 
– C. botulinum, S.aureus, B. cereus, C. perfringens, algae, shellfish 
poisoning   
• Chemical 
– heavy metals, organic compounds etc. 
 
Routes of Food Contamination  
• Contamination of raw food or failure to eliminate contamination of raw food 
– Farming practice/abattoir practice/zoonotic problems 
– Pasteurisation failure 
– Undercooking, inadequate cooling 
 
• Contamination during food preparation 
– Infected food handler 
– Environmental contamination 
– Cross contamination (from raw or processed ingredients) 
 
• Contamination after food preparation 
– Infected food handler 
– Inadequate storage, cooling or reheating 
– Environmental contamination 
– Cross contamination from raw food 
What are the Elements of a Foodborne Outbreak 
Investigation? 
• Epidemiological investigation 
Cases, distribution - who, when, where relationships 
• Laboratory investigation 
Pathogen identification  
• Environmental investigation 
Premises, physical environment, food, water  
 
Steps of an outbreak investigation 
• Confirm outbreak and diagnosis 
• Define a case  
• Identify cases & obtain information 
• Describe cases in time, place, person 
• Develop hypothesis 
• Test hypothesis - analytical epidemiology 
• Conduct additional investigations 
• Communicate results 
• Implement control measures 
 
 
 
Detection of an outbreak 
• Systematic surveillance 
• Disease notifications (laboratory or clinical) 
• Non-statutory laboratory/clinical surveillance 
• Detection of additional cases during investigation of a 
sporadic case 
• An alert clinician 
• General public 
• Media 
Outbreak Notification 
• Under S.I. No. 707, all outbreaks of disease are notifiable to the 
Medical Officer of Health regardless of whether the specific pathogen 
implicated is notifiable or not.  
• Moreover, unusual clusters or changing patterns of illness are also 
notifiable. It is not necessary for a pathogen to have been identified 
before an outbreak is notified. 
Confirm outbreak 
Is this an outbreak? 
• More cases than expected? 
• Surveillance data 
• Surveys: hospitals, labs, physicians 
 
Caution! 
• Seasonal variations 
• Notification artefacts 
• Diagnostic bias (new technique) 
• Diagnostic errors (pseudo-outbreaks) 
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Outbreak Control Team 
Multidisciplinary 
•  Public Health Physicians                   
•  Environmental Health Officers 
•  Clinical Microbiologist 
•  Food Safety Authority 
•  Reference Laboratories     
 
 
  
Roles 
•    Coordinate all activities 
•     Liaison 
•     Media 
•     Maintain a record of  investigation   
•    Produce reports      
 
Epidemiology 
Food safety 
Clinicians 
Laboratory 
Media Authorities 
Diagnostic 
Clinical 
Specimen  
 transfer 
Dead Sick 
Exposed 
Surveillance Investigation 
Prediction 
Supply channels 
Trace  
back 
 Decisions 
Infrastructure 
Regulations 
Vaccinations etc 
Vector 
Reservoir 
Investigation 
Co-ordination 
Confirm diagnosis 
• Laboratory confirmation  
– culture and/or PCR 
– serology 
– typing 
–detection of toxins 
• Discuss/meet with attending physicians 
• Contact the laboratories 
Not always necessary to confirm all the cases 
but confirm a proportion 
 throughout the outbreak  
Case definition 
• Standard set of criteria for deciding whether          an individual 
should be classified as suffering from the disease (or health 
condition) under investigation  
• Criteria 
– clinical and/or biological criteria 
– time  
– place  
– Person 
• Case definition can be adjusted if new information becomes 
available 
 
Identify cases and obtain information 
• Case finding 
– Notifications 
– Hospitals, GPs, Laboratories 
– Schools 
– Workplaces, etc. 
• Data collection form 
– Identifying information 
– Patient demographics 
– Clinical  information 
– Risk factor/exposure information 
 
 
Person 
Time 
Descriptive Epidemiology 
Describe cases by time, place and person 
• Where do they live?  • Who are the cases? • When did they become ill?  
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Time - Epidemic curve 
• Describe 
– start 
– peak(s) - number & duration 
– end 
– atypical cases (outliers) 
 
• Helps to develop hypotheses 
– incubation period 
– etiological agent 
– type of source 
– type of transmission 
– time of exposure 
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Examples of Epidemic curves  
hours 
cases 
cases 
cases 
days 
weeks 
Common point source Common persistent source 
Person-to-person source 
cases 
days 
Common intermittent source 
Place 
• Place of residence 
• Place of possible exposure  
–work 
–meals 
– travel routes                            
–day-care 
– leisure activities 
• Maps 
– identify an area at risk 
Person 
• Distribution of cases (numerator) 
– age 
– sex 
–occupation, etc. 
  
• Distribution of these variables in the population 
(denominator)  
 
• Attack rates 
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Develop hypotheses 
Pathogen? 
Source? 
Transmission? 
Hypotheses generation 
At risk? 
Vehicle? 
Person
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Salmonella 
Tools for Hypothesis Generation in Ireland  
Trawling Questionnaires 
VTEC Generic IID 
•WATER 
•TRAVEL –FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC 
•ANIMAL EXPOSURES –FARM, PET, WILDLIFE 
•OUTDOOR ACTIVITIES 
•EATING OUT 
•READY-TO-EAT -TAKE OUT, SANDWICH BARS, ETC 
•FOOD EXPOSURES 
•PORK AND PORK PRODUCTS 
•POULTRY 
•BEEF, LAMB & OTHER MEAT 
•FISH/SEAFOOD 
•EGGS/DAIRY 
•SALAD VEGETABLES 
•OTHER FRESH PRODUCE 
•OTHER SALAD INGREDIENTS 
•HERBS AND SPICES 
•FRUIT 
•SNACKS 
•SAUCES, PICKLES or DIPS 
•SHOPS 
Information collected on Trawling Questionnaires 
Sample page from questionnaire 
 •Apply trawling questionnaire  
-face-to-face or telephone interview (or online) 
•Record and analyse information in spreadsheet/database 
•Review data for common exposures  
•Followed by analytical study and/or microbiological investigation 
 
 
•Novel hypothesis generation tools, e.g. loyalty cards, etc. 
Hypotheses generation 
Test hypotheses  
Analytical studies 
 
Key feature is a comparison group 
•Cohort study 
–Attack rate in exposed group 
–Attack rate in unexposed group 
•Case-Control study 
–Odds of exposure in cases 
–Odds of exposure in control 
•General population –random selection 
 
•Survey panelists 
 
•Food consumption surveys 
 
•Case-case approach 
 
•Commercial sales data 
Sources of data for comparison 
Additional investigations 
 
• Microbiological investigation  
• Environmental investigation 
• Veterinarian investigation 
• Trace back investigations (origin of foods) 
 
The Role of Primary and Reference Laboratories in Outbreak Investigations 
52 
•Detection of clusters and outbreaks 
•Outrule links with unrelated cases 
•Confirm link between suspected source and human cases 
Examples of laboratory methods to type micro-organisms 
•Serotyping 
•Phage typing 
•Molecular typing, e.g. PFGE, MLVA 
•Sequencing (WGS, NGS, etc) 
Implement control measures 
• Commence immediately outbreak is identified 
• At first - general measures 
• According to findings – more specific measures 
 
Aim -  To protect persons at risk and prevent future outbreaks  
– Controlling the source of the pathogen 
– Interrupting /blocking the mode of transmission 
– Control of distant cases – inter/national alerts 
– Modifying the host response/defence 
– Risk group protection 
 
 
Communication 
• OCT 
• Media 
• Affected population 
• Wider public health community 
• General public 
Outbreak Report 
• Detailed report at the end  
– communicate public health messages 
–provide recommendations 
– influence public health policy 
– training tool  
– legal proceedings 
The reality…. 
Outbreak 
suspected
time
Confirmation
Form Outbreak 
Control Team
Confirm Diagnosis
Site visit
Case definition
Line list
Organize Data
Descriptive 
Epidemiology
Control measures
Analytical
Epidemiology
Recommendations
Report
Publication
Communication

DT8 outbreak case definition 
A confirmed case was defined as a person 
who had a laboratory-confirmed infection 
with Salmonella Typhimurium DT8 (MLVA 
pattern 2-10-NA-12-212 or a closed related 
pattern) and who had a date of onset after 
August 1st 2009. 
MLVA 
2-10-NA-12-212 
or closely related pattern 
PFGE 
Garvey et al. 2012. Investigation and management of an outbreak of SalmonellaTyphimurium DT8 associated with duck eggs, Ireland 2009 to 
2011  http://www.eurosurveillance.org/images/dynamic/EE/V18N16/art20454.pdf 
Lab data source: NSSLRL, Galway  
Distribution of DT8 outbreak cases by month of onset 
Garvey et al. 2012. Investigation and management of an outbreak of SalmonellaTyphimurium DT8 associated with duck eggs, Ireland 2009 to 
2011  http://www.eurosurveillance.org/images/dynamic/EE/V18N16/art20454.pdf 
Trawling questionnaires indicated higher than expected consumption of 
duck eggs 
Known duck egg exposure explained 23 of 32 (72%) cases.  
Traceback by EHS and DAFM and microbiological investigations provided evidence implicating 
several duck flocks 
Exposure to duck eggs Number of cases
Consumed duck eggs 18
Possible contact with duck eggs 4
Presumed secondary case 1
No duck egg exposure reported 9
Duck egg exposure unknown 3
Control Measures 
1. Advice for consumers 
I. Press releases (n=3) advising thorough cooking 
II. Point-of sale notices (FSAI) 
III. Public information campaign with postcards by Safefood  
2. For positive flocks (DAFM) 
I. Movement of birds restricted 
II. Voluntary cull initially 
III. Duck house cleansing and disinfection 
IV. New birds to be sourced from salmonella negative flocks 
3. DAFM Code of practice introduced in summer 2010 
I. Traceability 
II. Disease control 
III. Biosecurity  
IV. Testing 
4. DAFM Guidelines for backyard producers in October 2010 
5. Legislation SI 565 of 2010 
I. Legal basis for salmonella controls in all duck flocks which trade for profit 
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Fitzgerald M, et al. Euro Surveill. 2014;19(43):pii=20942. Available online: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle. 
aspx?ArticleId=20942 
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Analytical epidemiology –Case Control Study Findings 
65 
Hepatitis A outbreak summary 
•21 outbreak cases 
•Concurrent outbreaks in other European countries 
•In analytical epidemiological study, cases were more likely than controls to have eaten berry 
cheesecake, whole frozen berries, yoghurt containing frozen berries or raw celery.  
•Among cases, 91% had consumed at least one of four products containing frozen berries.  
•Sixteen food samples tested were all negative for HAV, and source of berries not identified (see  also 
European Food Safety Authority, 2014. Tracing of food items in connection to the multinational hepatitis A virus outbreak in Europe. EFSA 
Journal 2014;12(9):3821, 186 pp. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2014.3821)  
•As products containing frozen berries were implicated in the outbreak, the public were advised to 
heat-treat frozen berries before consumption. 
Fitzgerald M, et al. Euro Surveill. 2014;19(43):pii=20942. Available online: http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle. 
aspx?ArticleId=20942 
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International Health Regulations 
• To prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health response to the international 
spread of disease  
• Member States must notify the WHO of public health emergencies of international concern 
(PHEICs), 
• Extraordinary events that pose a public health risk through the international spread of disease 
to the rest of the world  
• Public Health Emergencies 
– Health impact (seriousness) 
– Unexpected nature 
• International concern 
– Risk of international spread 
– International response (restrictions to travel or trade) 
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International Perspectives 
• ECDC:  
– Surveillance of ID in Europe 
– Through surveillance networks 
– Provision of technical and scientific expertise  
– Support the networking activities of competent bodies 
• EFSA:  
– Assess risks associated with the food chain in Europe 
– Communicate risks openly based on independent scientific advice of 
scientific expert panels  




Conclusions 
Background Reading 
WHO, 2017. Available at http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/foodborne_disease/surveillancemanual/en/ 
FSAI, 2016. Available at https://www.fsai.ie/resources_publications.html 
  
Questions? 
• Contact online : 
http://emii.ie/contact-us/ 
• Twitter : 
https://twitter.com/emergencymii 
